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Michel Foucault’s genealogies have convincingly demonstrated that the discourses, 
practices, and even our physical ways of existing that we imagine are universal and natural, 
actually do have a history.  Even those things we hold most dear as signs of our inner truth 
and individuality are not outside the sociohistorical context from which they arise.  Our 
most basic desires have a history.  Foucault’s History of Sexuality series has been influential 
in the field of cultural studies of antiquity, garnering praise for its fresh approach but also 
criticism for its limited focus and lack of historical rigor.  This latter charge fails, I think, to 
appreciate Foucault’s expressed goals for his own work.  Rather than attempting to provide 
an “accurate” picture of what life was like in antiquity, he is interested in historicizing the 
subject in other moments in time in order to problematize self and subjecthood in the 
present.  This shifting concern parallels, for example, that in feminist studies of antiquity, 
where some scholars engage in a recuperative project—what did women do, think, and 
want—versus one of representation—i.e., what do the discourses of sex, gender, family, and 
so on tell us about how the society saw and organized itself?  In this sense, then, Foucault’s 
project differs from that of the classical philologist who examines the various uses of words 
across the entire corpus in an effort to get at the psyche or social truth of a time period.  At 
the same time, however, Foucault’s project is limited by his acknowledged lack of 
proficiency in ancient languages and history such that he alone cannot follow his project to 
its logical ends.  
 David Konstan’s monograph The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks in many ways 
bridges this boundary between the genealogist and the historian or classicist and offers the 
sort of precise study of self that Foucault’s work suggests is necessary in order to unsettle 
assumptions about the universality of contemporary human experience.  The text argues 
that the ways the ancient Greeks conceived of emotion and emotional experiences differed 
from those in the contemporary period in ways that reveal not only the very different social 
organization of the time period, but also the very different construction of the subject itself. 
As such, the study of ancient Greek emotions teaches us about the history and context of 
antiquity and also, potentially, about our current understandings of emotion and, even 
more fundamentally, selfhood.  
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Konstan takes Aristotle’s Rhetoric as its point of departure.  Aristotle’s text is written as a 
handbook for rhetors, helping them to understand and learn various ways of appealing to 
emotions in the art of persuasion, making the Rhetoric an excellent resource for exploring 
the scientific life of emotions, as well as the role of emotions in intersubjective exchange 
dependent on narrative context.  Konstan shows how, given the social context and life of 
emotions in ancient Greek culture, emotion was an act of cognition, of judgment, one that 
was centered on the acts and responses of the other.  This differs fundamentally from the 
contemporary understanding of emotions as self-centered, aligned with the production of 
the Christian self-confessing subject, whose emotions are seen as fundamental to a sense of 
self.  Emotions that are considered wholly individual, such as melancholy or romantic 
jealousy, have no counterpart in the ancient emotional vocabulary.  Marking this difference 
demonstrates how emotions, far from being universal expressions of some essential human-
ness, have a history. 
 Konstan explores this claim in depth by means of an analysis of twelve emotions. 
The first chapter, “Pathos and Passion,” lays out his general argument that Greek emotion 
is best understood as a response to actions that affect the social standing of interested 
parties in which emotion is part of an intersubjective exchange rather than an internal state. 
This general argument is supported by close readings of emotional terms from Aristotle in 
the context of other ancient texts.  These analyses demonstrate the power of the classical 
philologist’s approach to what we might still call genealogy.  For example, Konstan’s 
chapter on jealousy argues convincingly that an emotion we see as basic to our sense of love 
and human relationship had no counterpart in ancient Greece.  His evidence starts with the 
fact that Aristotle fails to mention the emotion in his Rhetoric, but Konstan then explores the 
appearance of the term in wider contexts, answering the lay reader’s immediate doubt. 
Greek tragedy is all about romantic jealousy, is it not?  How else can we explain Medea’s 
deadly revenge after Jason leaves her?  Or Odysseus’s reaction when he returns home and 
finds that Penelope has had to resist many suitors?  Konstan shows through a close 
examination of various words and contexts that what looks like jealousy to modern eyes is 
not about a romantic sense of jealousy, but instead about infringements on social norms of 
personal welfare and status.  His analysis works to historicize emotions we see as natural 
and further illuminates Greek cultural life on its own terms. 
 This idea that in ancient Greece various emotions concern breaches of social norms 
and status runs through Konstan’s volume and demonstrates well the effect social 
organization has on self-awareness.  In his chapter on anger, for example, Konstan shows 
how anger is a response to a slight by someone of lesser status, dependent on the ability to 
exact revenge, an ability contingent on unequal status in the status-focused world of 
antiquity.  Unlike modern conceptions of anger that rely on demonizing the other, for 
example, the hierarchical world of Greek power and status produced anger that was 
usually motivated by a desire to maintain proper power relationships in the city-state 
society.  This conception is further developed in his chapter on satisfaction, or what is often 
interpreted as the emotion opposed to anger.  Konstan shows how, given the political 
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structure of the state and its emphasis on status, very little time would be spent on 
performing acts to improve one’s character, since one’s character and status were not 
dependent on the words or deeds of another. 
 Overall, Konstan’s book does a good job of showing the very different social world 
of emotion in ancient Greece.  Though there is overlap in emotional life between modern 
and ancient cultures, it is not Konstan’s concern.  He is more concerned with confronting 
the contemporary scholar’s tendency to make definitions based on contemporary 
understanding.  As Konstan shows in his chapter on shame, echoing Foucault’s work on 
modern subjectivity, the sense of an internal self is a contemporary historical production. 
Rather than assuming that the lack of Greek guilt tied to ethical life demonstrates moral 
backwardness, Konstan asks what the other-directed sense of shame has to tell us about 
different social and subjective worlds and the historical nature of our own senses of 
subjectivity.  In his chapter on love, though, Konstan shows that philia, in its constitution as 
an emotion that exceeds the self in its uncoerced desire to provide for another (176), 
overlaps in an important sense our own concepts of love. This differs from the rest of the 
chapters that focus almost solely on the differences between their emotions and ours.  The 
discussion of love thus offers a complex examination what difference means, and what our 
similarities might have to say about the status of emotions more generally.  At the same 
time, though, our notions of friendship and the love for a friend are impoverished in 
comparison.  Konstan’s analyses, even when they articulate similarities, put into sharp 
focus the differences between our conceptions of emotions and those of the ancient Greeks, 
demonstrating the different moral universes and senses of self and other social 
organizations of these historical contexts.  In so doing, he offers an important supplement to 
Foucault’s project, showing that emotions do indeed have a history, and even what seems 
natural—how we feel—is constituted by language, culture, and power. 
 At the same time, the reader must do much of this work of connection.  A number of 
chapters declare that the goal is to illuminate some aspect of the present. Any history, to 
recall Foucault, is a history of the present.  Not only does history historicize the present, but 
it also lays bare the problematics that dominate the present context.  What do modern 
concerns with the cultural life of emotions have to tell us about our own conceptions of 
ourselves, our relations to others, and the social world we inhabit?  What do the very 
questions the scholar asks have to say about the discursive world that scholar inhabits? 
What questions fail to make sense in the ancient versus contemporary context?  Konstan 
declares that his study can shed light on these questions, but his emphasis on the 
philological variations of the Aristotelian emotional vocabulary militates against the 
cultural studies work he claims his text does.  The opening chapter declares that his study 
has significant implications for understanding classical Greek emotions in philosophy and 
literature, but that it might also “offer a useful perspective on certain problems in the 
scientific interpretation of the emotions today.”(40)  These connections to the present come 
at the end of each chapter, but often amount to a hope that the chapter has helpfully 
illuminated contemporary debates about emotions.  For example, Konstan ends his chapter 
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on shame with the claim that “… a careful examination of the value of emotion terms in 
other languages can also enrich and clarify our own emotional vocabulary.”(110)  This is 
assuredly the case, but the reader is left largely responsible for doing that work. But for this 
it might be important to remember that any reading demands a construction of a world 
between reader and author.  Konstan’s book is rich with examples and an important 
addition to  studies of the present that Foucault convincingly shows in his own work are 
necessary for locating that position slantwise to power from which we might resist the very 
conditions of our subjectivity. 
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